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CASE NOTES
agreement with Studebaker at an unprofitable price, when on the surface
it appears that neither a business benefit nor a possible price discrimination
in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act can thereby result, seems entirely
unreasonable. Thus, when dealer-wide offers continued and where there was an
implication of a secret dealing between the defendants, such facts provide
an instance where the requirement of actual purchase should be waived 2 6
Rather, it is suggested that the plaintiff need only establish that it would
have become a purchaser at the special lower price offered to its competitor.
THOMAS HUGH TRIMARCO
Uniform Commercial Code—Products Liability—Requirement of Priv-
ity in the Breach of Warranties.—Wilson v. American Chain El Cable
Co. 1—Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff when thrown from a rotary lawn mower into the path of its revolving
blade, as the machine came to a sudden stop when striking an incline. The
machine was manufactured by the defendant and had been purchased from
a local dealer by the plaintiff's father. Separate theories of liability were
pleaded and bottomed on the alleged negligence of and breach of warranty
by the manufacturer. It was not specified whether the warranties allegedly
breached were express or implied. The defendant moved to dismiss the
action as to breach of warranty on the ground that there was no privity
of contract between the defendant and the injured party. The plaintiff
moved to strike, asserting that in Pennsylvania a lack of privity is not a
defense to a suit by a subpurchaser or members of his family against a
manufacturer on breach of warranty principles. HELD: The defense of
lack of privity could not, under Pennsylvania law, be stricken, where there
was no showing as to whether the warranty was implied or express, and
where no showing had been made as to whether the manufacturer had in-
tended either an express or implied warranty to flow through the conduit
of a contractual chain to a subpurchaser and his family.
The Uniform Commercial Code states that a seller2 impliedly war-
25 It has been held that it was not necessary for a customer to make a purchase
at the discriminatory higher price: "in order to attain the status of a competing pur-
chaser under the Act, as its failure to do so was directly attributable to defendant's own
discriminatory practice." American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th
Cir. 1951).
1 216 F. Supp. 32 (ED. Pa. 1963).
2 Section 2-103 of the UCC defines "seller" as "a person who sells or contracts
to sell goods." However, it would appear that this definition is broad enough to
encompass suits against the manufacturer, even though he is not the immediate seller.
Professor Del Duca in his article Extension of Warranty Protection Under Section 2-318,
appearing in the B.C. U.C.C. CO-ORD (1963) 415, suggests: "In sustaining the son's
cause of action against the manufacturer, the court could have ruled that since the
purchaser-father had warranty protection against the manufacturer this warranty pro-
tection also extended to the beneficiary-son by virtue of Section 2-318." (Emphasis
supplied.) The case under analysis was Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luz. L. Reg.
R. 159 (Pa. 1962). Thus one is confronted with a manufacturer, a wholesaler and a
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rants that the goods sold are merchantable and fit for the intended purpose. 3
Unless this implied warranty is specifically excluded, 4 it applies as between
seller and purchaser. Under an implied warranty count, the purchaser need
only prove that his injury resulted from reasonable use or exposure to the
goods. He need not prove that the seller was negligent. If the person in-
jured by the alleged defective goods was not the purchaser, but was in the
purchaser's family or household or a guest in his home and would reason-
ably be expected to use or be affected by the goods, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code extends the implied warranty received by the purchaser, and
any express warranties that the purchaser may have received, to the in-
jured party.° However, when, as here, the suit is by the purchaser or a mem-
ber of his household against a party that is not the immediate seller, the
absence of contractual privity may, in a given jurisdiction, be determinative.
The Code is neutral on this point, leaving the applicable state law and cases
to resolve the question.°
The states which allow the imposition of the defense of lack of privity
hold that since there was no contractual obligation between a manufacturer
and the retail buyer or between a seller and a person other than the retail
buyer, who does not come within the class protected by Section 2-318 of
the Code, the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness does not extend
to the injured person. This of course assumes that the manufacturer, in
the former case, did not give an express warranty to the ultimate consumer,
retailer all involved in the goods that eventually come into the hands of the retail
buyer. This is the so-called "vertical line" of distribution. The goods, now in the hands
of the retail buyer, may also pass to a sub-buyer, a successor, a guest, a relative, a
member of the household, etc., before the defective goods result in injury to someone.
This is the so-called "horizontal line" of distribution.
8 Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Section 2-314. (1) "Unless excluded or
modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind.. . .(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (a) pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description; and . • . (c) are fit for the ordi-
nary purposes for which such goods are used; and . . (f) conform to the promises
or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any."
4 UCC Section 2-316(2) "to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchant-
ability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a
writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness
the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous."
5 Id. at Section 2-318 "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section." (Emphasis supplied.) Comment 2
"The purpose of this section is to give the buyer's family, household and guests the
benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the contract of sale, thereby
freeing any such beneficiaries from any technical rules as to 'privity.' It seeks to
accomplish this purpose without any derogation of any right or remedy resting on
negligence."
6
 Id. at Section 2-318, Comment 3 "Beyond this, the section is neutral and is
not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
chain."
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and that the retailer, in the latter instance did not warrant that the express
or implied warranties given by him to the buyer would extend to any other
person. In the present case, the plaintiff did not assert that any express war-
ranty was given by the manufacturer to the retail buyer, and thus the court's
ruling against plaintiff's motion to strike the defense of lack of privity must
be read within this narrow factual framework. Counsel for the plaintiff based
his motion to strike the manufacturer's defense of lack of privity on the
ground that the defense of lack of privity in an implied warranty action had
been abolished in Pennsylvania. The court's response was less than unequiv-
ocal: "We cannot say ... that lack of privity is not a valid defense under
Pennsylvania law." 7
The defense of lack of privity had its origin in 1842 in the English
case of Winterbottom v. Wright,8 and was subsequently adopted by almost
all American jurisdictions in actions based both upon negligence and breach
of warranty. The tide began to turn in 1916 with the McPherson v. Buick 9
case, where it was held that an injured remote purchaser could sue a
negligent manufacturer. Today almost every jurisdiction has followed the
McPherson case in this regard." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
the case of Henderson v. National Drug Co." approved the doctrine enun-
ciated in the McPherson decision: "We have put aside the notion that the
duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may
be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else.m 2
While it is apparent that plaintiff, in the present case, can sue the manu-
facturer on a negligence count without proof of privity between the parties,
there are strong doubts as to the adequacy of this remedy. The burden of
proof is generally on the plaintiff, and this may prove to be beyond his reach
—even when aided by such things as the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and
extensive discovery procedures. He must not only prove that the mower
7 Supra note 1, at 35.
8 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
9 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
19 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)
69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1103-10 (1960). The author comes to the conclusion that the
McPherson doctrine has been adopted in all but two states; Hursh, Am. Law of
Prod. Liab. § 6:15, p. 533. See also note 13 to this text, p. 533, stating, "As a con-
sequence of the dissatisfaction with the rule, many exceptions to it have been drawn
. . . and it has been entirely repudiated in many jurisdictions . . . including the
jurisdiction in which it was established. . . ." In support of this statement the note
cites Am. Law of Prod. Liab. § 6:57, pp. 629-630 discussing the Winterbottom case,
and citing M'Alister v. Stevenson (Eng) 1932 [AC] 562 (HL), frequently cited as
the Donoghue Case; Frumer & Friedman, Prod. Liab. § 5.01, p. 14; § 16.03(2), pp. 378-
382.
11 343 Pa. 601, 23 A.2d 743 (1942); See also, Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F.
Supp. 888, 891 (ED. Pa. 1962): "Lack of privity does not bar Duckworth's claim for yet
another reason. The jury found that Ford's negligence . . . was a proximate cause of
the accident, and it is well settled that privity of contract is not required in an action
against a manufacturer based on negligence. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) ; Foley v. Pittsburg Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517
(1949); Restatement, Torts, §§ 395,,396." See I Williston, Sales § 244(a)-(f) (Supp.
1960).
32 Id. at 611, 23 A.2d at 749.
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was defective or unsafe, but also that the manufacturer was negligent in
this regard. One is not necessarily the concomitant of the other.
The landmark case on the issue of the privity requirement in a war-
ranty action is the decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.," where the plaintiff bought an auto-
mobile from a local dealer which he gave to his wife. While driving the
car, she was injured as the result of an accident caused by a defect in the
steering mechanism. There was clearly a lack of any privity between the
manufacturer of the car and the injured plaintiff, and thus the action was
based on a breach of implied warranty of merchantability and fitness. In
sustaining the plaintiff's contention the court stated:
It is important to express the right of Mrs. Henningsen to
maintain her action in terms of a general principle. To what extent
may lack of privity be disregarded in suits of such warranties?
... By a parity of reasoning, it is our opinion that an implied war-
ranty of merchantability chargeable to either an automobile manu-
facturer or a dealer extends to the purchaser of the car, members
of his family, and to other persons occupying or using it with his
consent. It would be wholly opposed to reality to say that use by
such persons is not within the anticipation of parties to such a
warranty.. .. Those persons must be considered within the distrib-
utive chain." (Emphasis supplied.)
There have been Pennsylvania decisions which, in effect, follow the
reasoning of the Henningsen case. The 1946 case of Mannsz v. MacWhyte,l 5
a circuit' court of appeals decision applying Pennsylvania law, involved the
question of privity as regards a warranty action by individuals other than
the purchasers against the manufacturer of the defective goods. In that
opinion the court said:
We think it is clear that whether the approach to the problem
be by way of warranty or under the doctrine of negligence, the
requirement of privity between the injured party and the manu-
facturer of the article which has injured him has been obliterated
from the Pennsylvania law. 1° (Emphasis supplied.)
13 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69'(1960).
14 32 N.J. at 388, 161 A.2d at 100. A similar result was reached in Kansas in
the case of B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1959). There
the court stated:
The question arises as to whether an implied warranty ran to Berneice,
privity between her and Goodrich being absent. . . . Under the law of Kansas
an implied warranty is not contractual. It is an obligation raised by the law
as an inference from the acts of the parties or the circumstances of the trans-
action and it is created by operation of law and does not arise from any
agreement in fact of the parties. The Kansas decisions are in accord with the
general rule laid down in the adjudicated cases. And under the Kansas
decisions privity is not essential where an implied warranty is imposed by
the law on the basis of public policy. (Emphasis supplied.)
15 155 F.2d 445 (3d Or. 1946).
10 Id. at 449, 450.
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Privity of contract in suits against manufacturers to recover for personal
injury arising out of a breach of warranty seemed also to be abolished by
decisional law in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, a court
of intermediate state-wide appellate jurisdiction, in the case of Jarnot v.
Ford Motor Co.," said:
A person, who after the purchase of a thing, has been damaged
because of its unfitness for the intended purpose may bring an
action in assumpsit against the manufacturer based on a breach of
implied warranty of fitness; and proof of a contractual relationship
of privity between the manufacturer and the purchaser. is not
necessary to impose liability for the damage. 18 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Thompson v. Reedman," the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania followed the lead, and in fact went
one step further than did Jarnot. In Jarnot, the action was brought by a
purchaser in the distributive chain, while in the Thompson case, the action
for personal injuries was brought by a guest in the car that was driven
by the purchaser. The court, while finding Section 2-318 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code inapplicable, nevertheless held that lack of privity would not
preclude the plaintiff from recovering for breach of warranties of merchant-
ability and fitness." It is noteworthy in this regard that courts in other juris-
dictions had similarly concluded that the requirement of privity in warranty
cases had been abolished in Pennsylvania?'
If this had been the status of the decisional law in Pennsylvania on
this issue, it would appear that the court in the present case had reached
an erroneous result in refusing to strike the defense of lack of privity.
However, in 1962 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down its
opinion in the case of Hochgertle v. Canada 'Dry Corp.,22 where, unlike
Jarnot, the injured party was not a buyer in the distributive chain but
rather an employee in the purchaser's business. The court held that the
absence of a contractual relationship between the parties barred recovery in
a suit for breach of warranty since the remedy in such cases had been
extended only to persons injured by unwholesome food or other articles
for human consumption. The court stated:
In no case in Pennsylvania has recovery against the manu-
facturer for breach of an implied warranty been extended beyond a
purchaser in the distributive chain." (Emphasis supplied.)
n 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
IS Id. at 430, 156 A.2d at 572.
19 199 F. Supp. 120 (ED. Pa. 1961).
20 Id. at 121. The plaintiff tried to bring himself within the coverage of Q 2-318.
However the court held that: "Plaintiff argues that, since a 'guest in his home' is
covered, then a guest in an automobile should be similarly covered. . . . [I]t seems
more consistent with the plain meaning of words to understand the comment as
leaving this present situation at large. It is too much of a leap it seems to classify
a guest passenger in an automobile as a guest in the home."
et McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 at 254 (D. Conn., 1960) ;
Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
22 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
28 Id. at 615, 187 A.2d at 578.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has, in effect, stated that the Federal
cases which appeared to abolish the requirement of privity have gone too far.
The court rested its decision on the further ground that recovery in
the case of implied warranties is based on the fact that the implied war-
ranty forms part of the consideration and flows from the manufacturer to
the purchaser through the "conduit of a contractual chain." This is clearly
an inconsistency in terms, for, to abuse the obvious, if the warranties were
part of the consideration, then they would be express warranties and could
not be implied, for it is assumed in the latter instance that the parties did
not rely on them, in concluding their bargain 2 3
With the decision in Hochgertle and its effect on the present case, the
Pennsylvania courts have taken a backward step through the pages of
judicial progress. No one will deny the complete change in the structure of
our present day economy over that which existed when the courts initially
accepted the doctrine of privity. 24
As one court has said it:
Even the doctrine of privity, which is the main stumbling
block to extending a remedy to consumers generally . . . against
a seller or manufacturer . . . has itself been used to extend the
remedy to others than the buyer . . . through various expedients
... such as (a) the theory of a third party beneficiary, or (b) the
agency theory, or (c) some other fiction to establish a relationship
between the injured consumer and the seller or manufacturer. 25
23a Considering for a moment the situation of the plaintiff in the present case—
he finds himself in a precarious position. He must overcome the defense of lack of
privity by showing that the manufacturer by express warranty (if one exists) intended
a warranty to flow through the "conduit of a contractual chain" to the purchaser
and his family. If he can prove the former (warranty to the purchaser) but not the
latter (warranty extended to members of purchaser's family) he will not succeed, at
least on the warranty count. It is the opinion of this writer that 2-318 of the UCC
does not include a manufacturer in the word seller, as used in that section. Neither is
there any case interpreting that section of the Code which has come to that conclusion.
Section 2-103 of the UCC defines "seller" as ". . . a person who sells or contracts to
sell goods." Thus to say that a manufacturer fits within this definition would be
stretching the point, to say the least. As Comment 3 of Section 2-318 states: "Beyond
this, the section is neutral.. . ." However, Professor Del Duca in his article, Extension
of Warranty Protection Under Section 2-318, published in the B.C. U.C.C. CO-ORD.
415, infers that the word seller as used in 2-318 is broad enough to include "manu-
facturer" within its definition. On pages 428-29 the author stated: "In sustaining the
son's cause of action against the manufacturer the court could have ruled that since
the purchaser-father had warranty protection against the manufacturer this warranty
protection also extended to the beneficiary -son by virtue of Section 2 -318." (Emphasis
supplied.) The case involved was Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luz. L. Reg. 159 (Pa.
1962).
24 3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 259 (1962) "IA] person harmed by a product
could recover for breach of warranty only from his immediate vendor. Although this
may have been adequate during the period preceding the industrial revolution, it
proved inadequate when industry expanded to a point where manufacturer and con-
sumer, while at remote ends of a long and complex chain of distribution were brought
together as a theoretical buyer and seller by modern advertising and marketing prac-
tices."
26 Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 102 (D. Hawaii 1961).
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Indeed, "these exceptions have reached a place in the law where they have
almost, if not completely swallowed up the so-called 'rule.' "20
Dean Prosser, in a recent article on the subject, has concluded that
seven "spectacular decisions" all decided during 1958 and 1959 completely
abolished privity as a requirement for recovery in breach of warranty actions
against remote vendors. He stated:
Seven such cases, in so short a time, may very well be .. .
a trend. . .. [T]hey give the definite impression that the dam
has busted, and those in the path of the avalanche would do well to
make for the hills. 27
Professor Del Duca in his article on Extension of Warranty Protection Under
Section 2-318, states: "Dean Prosser's 1960 prediction of future 'spectac-
ular decisions' augmenting those of 1958 and 1959 has already been sub-
stantiated by at least ten such cases. . . 199
The text writers in the field, along with recent opinions" and legisla-
tions° in some of the states have brought to light the inappropriateness
and injustice of the defense of privity in our present day economy. It is
hoped that the remaining "privity" states through their courts or legislatures
will take heed of a remark made by Daniel Webster many years ago. "When
the mariner has been tossed for many days in thick weather, and on an
unknown sea, he naturally avails himself of the first pause in the storm, the
earliest glance of the sun, to take his latitude, and ascertain how far the
elements have driven him from his true course." 3 ' Nevertheless, it has been
28 Hursh, Am. Law of Prod. Liab. § 6:16, p. 536,
27 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1113 (1960). The seven cases referred to are: Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Con-
tinental Copper Steel Indus. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1958);
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Jarnot v. Ford
Motor Co., supra note 17; Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. App. 1959);
Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
28 B.C. U.C.C. CO-ORD. 415, 438 (1963).
To be added to this ever expanding group of ten cases is a recent Connecticut
case, Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (1963),
involving a plaintiff who rented a powered golf cart from Gerardi, who had in turn
purchased it from a retailer-distributor, who in turn had purchased it from the manu-
facturer. Plaintiff was injured when the back rest of the cart broke. The court held
that since the golf cart was intended for use by the public in the same manner in which
plaintiff used it, it would be illogical to allow Gerardi to recover from the retailer -
and deny a similar right to plaintiff.
29 Supra notes 13, 15, 17, 19, 27 and 29.
39 Supra note 24. Significant in thii regard is the fact that the legislature of
Georgia has enacted a statute which, in effect, abolishes the requirement of privity in
actions based on a breach of warranty. See Ga. Code Ann. § 96-307 (1958).
Warranty of manufacturer to ultimate consumer.
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, .either
directly or through wholesale or retail dealers, or any other preson, shall warrant
the following to the ultimate consumer.. .
I. The article is merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended.
31 Webster's second speech on Foot's resolution.
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the purpose of this note to emphasize that Pennsylvania waters have not,
as yet, been calmed; and that reconciliation of seemingly conflicting cases
can only come on a jurisdiction to jurisdiction, court to court basis, with
the ultimate result often turning on the intricacies of the factual framework.
THOMAS J. WINDY, JR.
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